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Abstract 
Much has been written about transforming organizations. At the heart of this activity is the 
notion of Business Process Redesign (BPR), the restructuring of a firm's basic business methods. 
We describe some of the forces that are behind this need for major organizational change. Next, 
we provide an overview of BPR and raise several questions concerning its suitability as a 
theoretical underpinning for radical organizational transformation. We then describe the 
transformation of Oticon, an international manufacturing firm with headquarters in Denmark. We 
have called this transformation a Metamorphosis because of the complete reconceptualization of 
the firm that took place. Using the example of Oticon, we speculate about the prerequisites for 
change of this extent, paying particular attention to the role of technology, which has been 
enabling rather than driving. 
1 Prepared for the IFIP Working Group 8.2 Conference, Michigan, USA August 1994. 
v. 1.7 March 9, 1994 
We are grateful to our colleague MaryJo Hatch for her helpful comments. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-95-13 
Introduction 
One current fashion in the management of technology is "organizational transformation," 
the radical change of an organization from one form to another, often as a result of the 
infusion of technology (Hammer 1990). In this conceptualization, the transformation 
takes place by subjecting basic business processes to intense scrutiny. That is, by 
recognizing those processes that are fundamental to the mission of a fm, reconstituting 
them in an eficient manner that cuts across functional lines and produces defined 
business outcomes; and constructing single person, complete jobs, with data gathered 
once where the work is performed and where parallel activities are linked together rather 
than integrated (Davenport and Short 1990; Hammer 1990). 
The power of technology should be used to: 
..radically redesign our business processes in order to achieve dramatic 
improvements in performance ... not to automate an existing process but to enable 
a new one (Hammer 1990, p. 108). 
In this view, technology creates these new organizational arrangements: ones that are 
flatter, with knowledge at the bottom rather than at the top; ones that consist of self 
organizing and managed work groups rather than command hierarchies; ones that use 
technological tools to augment human skills and abilities rather than enhance inequities 
among workers; and ones that use technology to link workers together so they may share 
knowledge and coordinate their activities rather than relying upon vertical 
communication (Drucker 1988). The implication of this approach is that the technology 
infrastructure is installed first and the organizational arrangements then follow. 
But there is much evidence that calls this notion into question. Studies of the impact of 
technology, for example, Bjgm-Andersen (1986) , Tmer(1984), and Kraut (1989), have 
typically shown relatively marginal effects on organizational structure and performance. 
Similarly, the number of instances where technology has been used successfdy as the 
driving force behind large scale organizational change are few. 
Every new generation of hardware and software has brought promises of simcant 
break throughs in organizational performance. Technology vendors have been keen to 
argue the organizational and strategic importance of their newest creations, and we as 
Information Technology (IT) and Management Information Systems (MIS) researchers 
have been equally quick to support a technology imperative. 
This paper presents first the pressures that are driving f m s  to transform their 
organizations. We then provide a short critique of business process redesign (BPR) and 
reengineering as a foundation for organizational transformation. Next, the Oticon case, 
an organization threatened by extinction that reinvented itself, is presented followed by 
an interpretation of what occurred. We end by summarizing what we have learned from 
the Oticon example about transforming organizations and the role of technology in that 
process 
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External pressures for organizational transformation 
Competition has become intense and operating environments are more complex, largely 
as a result of the ease with which information can be moved within and among 
organizations2. Not only has competition between f m s  increased but its nature has 
changed fundamentally. Being a large or low cost producer was often sufficient as a 
business strategy. Today, such approaches seem inadequate. More important is the 
ability to innovate and respond quickly to opportunities and changes in the environment, 
to reduce time to market, to improve customer service, and to enhance quality of 
products. 
Traditionally, f m s  have been organized into hierarchies based on principles of task 
specialization and span of control. Such organizations are often referred to as "command 
and control" because instructions issued at the top flow down through middle 
management to operatives at the bottom of the organization who execute them. Reports 
on operations flow in the opposite direction. Although such forms of organization may 
have unambiguous accountability, they tend not to take advantage of employee skills and 
abilities, and they lack self regulating mechanisms. They result in organizations which 
do not have the flexibility and adaptability required by these new business challenges. In 
order to meet these challenges, organizational theorists have proposed structures that are 
flatter and leaner, where work is performed by autonomous units augmented with 
infomation technology. Such new organization forms are referred to as "knowledge 
intensive," "networked," or "virtual"(Charan 1991; Drucker 1988). These structural 
innovations are not limited to internal options; they include external arrangements, such 
as partnerships and alliances. 
While these new organizational forms are appealing, there is Little practical experience 
with them. There are relatively few guidelines that can be used by managers to either 
select the proper target structure; the correct transformation process to get there; the way 
technology should be arranged; or the way to re-configure management processes, such 
as supervision, control and compensation in order to support these structures. Lf, for 
example, autonomous work units are given sufficient latitude and are innovative enough 
to make decisions on their own, what technology should be used to support them and how 
does one insure that coordination takes place and that integration is realized? How should 
existing coordination and control mechanisms be modified to be consistent with this 
situation? 
In the past, it was assumed that organizational designers had to choose between one 
extreme or the other, for example, between local autonomy or central control. However, 
neither of these options are likely to yield success in the turbulent, highly competitive 
environment being now being faced. Accordingly, we see companies formulating mixed 
strategies such as "being a global network of independent power centers each with its 
own growth targets and business strategies," and wanting to be a corporation that is 
"characterized by simplicity, transparency and vigor" composed of "power centers where 
ideas are examined critically in the context of our everyday b~siness"~ and beyond. In 
short, desiring to be nimble, innovative and enlightened firms. To be a firm that achieves 
both for a high level of autonomy on the local (divisional) level while maintaining overall 
Due partially to advances in communication and information technology. 
These quotations were taken from the annual report of a large, international Danish pharmaceutical fm. 
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coordination and synergy among functional units. Although these goals may be easy to 
state, they are far more difficult to realize. 
A pleasant consequence of the revolution in communications and information technology 
is that more options are now available for designing work, because technology can be 
used to augment human skills and abilities, and information and tools can be moved to 
where work is performed. Workers need no longer to be co-located in either space or 
time in order to work together. While technology may not cause such an innovative and 
enlightened fm to emerge, we maintain it has an important enabling role to play in 
creating one. 
A 21st century organization with these characteristics is faced with multiple challenges. 
How does a firm achieve: 
delegation of authority along with synergy? 
independence of action along with collaboration? 
decentralization of decision making along with managerial control? 
local power centers without excessive duplication? 
These issues becomes even harder for a transnational organization, where specialized 
functions need to be reallocated among business units based upon best practice, 
availability of labor, and markets. The tension between local, global, and corporate 
demands must be reconciled for each activity. While innovation in products and 
processes is desired, these need to be channeled into high payoff avenues. HOW can 
uniqueness and synergy be fostered together? When should a unit lead and when should 
it follow? 
While specific solutions can be created for each of these issues, they would be static. 
What is needed are self adjusting, dynamic mechanisms that change as conditions 
warrant. Discarding all. of the hoopla, is BPR and reengineering a likely process for such 
a demanding transformation as we have portrayed? And then, what role does technology 
play in BPR? 
Is BPR the answer? 
Business process redesign (BPR) or reengineering strives : 
to breakaway Erom the old rules about how we organize and conduct business. It 
involves recognizing and rejecting some of them and finding imaginative new 
ways of accomplishing work (Hammer 1990, p. 104- 105). 
This involves identifying the business processes that add value to an organization and 
result in tangible end products for users, and re conceptualizing them to be efficient 
whole person jobs that rely extensively on technology for communication, information, 
action, and coordination. The resulting jobs are cross functional and should be optimized 
across an organization. Unnecessary processes are discarded in order to realize 
performance benefits. 
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BPR has several short comings. It is based on principles of "scientific management"4; it 
is top-down, expert led; and it defines in advance a desired outcome (structure). We 
address each of these characteristics in turn. 
The inadequacies of scientific management are well documented. While concentrating on 
the development of efficient layouts and operational procedures, scienSc management 
neglects the "people" aspects of an organization. That is, it does not consider such 
factors as culture, power, politics, social structure, and motivation. While scientific 
management may result in an efficiently designed task, little consideration is given to the 
individuals who perform the task, how they work with others, and the factors that 
influence their behavior. 
In general, top-down, expert led interventions fail often because they assume that 
employee behavior can be isolated and changed individually (Beer and others 1990). 
Supporting this high failure rate, consulting companies in Denmark estimate that BPR 
succeeds only fdty percent of the time, and Bashein, Markus and Riley (1994) report that 
consultants publicly state 70% of BPR projects fail. Change needs to start at the 
periphery of an organization, and ought to be led by small ad hoc groups focused on the 
work itself (Beer and others 1990). The problem in an organization setting is not to 
identify constructive changes to make, but rather to select from among the many 
candidate options for redesign in some consistent manner and to obtain the support of 
those who will have to make changes in their work. 
Successful organization change is a dynamic rather than a static process. Thus, it makes 
little sense, as prescribed by BPR, to specify end configurations in advance. Ends need to 
emerge as the result of the change process itself (that is, to be emergent). It may well be 
that the process, rather than the end configuration, is the stable portion of change. 
For these reasons we believe the magnitude of organizational transformation suggested 
by the demands of the new competitive environment require a change process more 
encompassing and more based on process than is BPR We describe the Oticon case to 
see whether BPR principles or some other change mechanism appears to been operative, 
and to understand better the role that technology played in this process. 
Oticon 
One of the most dramatic examples of an organizational transformation where IT has 
played an important role is the Danish manufacturer of hearing aids, Oticon. 
Oticon is one of the five largest producers of hearing aids in the world, with about 1200 
employees and annual sales of approximately DKK 480 million (at current exchange rate 
about $80 million). Oticon is truly an international fm; it exports more than 90% of its 
production to over 100 countries through subsidiaries and agents. Oticon has its own 
basic research department, its own production facilities, and has positioned itself to be the 
preferred partner for leading hearing aid clinics around the world. 
Consistent with this philosophy, Oticon has always stressed the quality of their hearing 
aids, relying strongly on their engineering and product design. However, towards the end 
of the 80's customer demand changed from wanting a relatively large, high quality device 
behind the ear to a more discrete unit inside the ear. This trend was strongly exploited by 
It is even sometimes referred to as "the new industrial engineering" (Davenport and Short 1990). 
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a US competitor, and Oticon, who was number one in the industry in 1979 and a market 
leader until the mid 807s, was faced with decreasing market share (especially in the US 
market). Oticon suffered its first financial loss in 1986. 
A new CEO, Lars Kolind, was recruited in 1988, and managed to get the company into 
the black in 1989 by instituting drastic cost controls. Every single expenditure had to be 
approved by him personally. However, Kolind realized after a couple of years that all of 
the benefits of cost cutting had been realized. Only very marginal savings could be 
achieved from further conventional automation and cost reduction in production, and he 
turned his attention to a major restructuring of the head office in Denmark. 
The real issue was to transform Oticon from an industrial organization producing high 
quality standard hearing aids to a first rank service organization with a physical product. 
The organization Kolind envisioned, one in which the various functional units worked 
together in a truly integrated manner to craft innovative customer driven products and one 
that was more responsive to customer demands, could not be achieved by normal 
structural or procedural change. It was necessary to create a completely new, innovative, 
flexible, and learning organization. 
In the process of wrestling with these problems, Kolind explains: 
I sat down on New Year's Day in 1990 and txied to think the unthinkable: a vision 
for the company of tomorrow. It would be a company where jobs were shaped to 
fit the person instead of the other way around Each person would be given more 
functions and a job would emerge by the individual accumulating a portfolio of 
functions. 
Kolind called his new vision a "spaghetti organization" because the multiple roles people 
were to play were so intertwined. 
The headquater and administrative offices, which previously had been located in two 
different buildings, were merged into a totally new building, designed especially for the 
purpose, as part of the organizational transformation. 
What did Oticon do? 
Four types of organizational changes were initiated5 in order to reduce overhead costs, 
and to create a more flexible and innovative organization: 
Elimination of the traditional departments 
Instead of organizing the company into traditional departments, the head-office was 
turned into one large department, and all work was organized as projects in order to 
highlight their temporary nature. This discourages the departments from attending to their 
own interests instead of those of the full company. It furthermore discourages managers 
of the various departments from fighting for power for their own functional areas rather 
than working in the interests of the total organization. The absence of departments also 
provides for much more flexibility in responding to unexpected work demands. 
The following discussion pertains to a totally re-structured head oEce with roughly 130 employees 
concerned with marketing, accounting, R&D, production management, and servicing of the sales force and 
their customers. The production facilities, which are located around the world, were not changed as part of 
this transformation. 
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Marketing, for example, is an area where work load fluctuates throughout the year. 
August through November are particularly busy with preparations for exhibitions and 
trade shows. During the autumn, marketing could easily use 30 people. Now, instead of 
having a large fured number of employees working in marketing throughout the year, a 
much smaller staff permanently work there (around 5) including the (project) head. As 
the workload increases over summer and early autumn, more people are recruited 
internally from the other project groups (e.g. from R&D) to staff an expanded and 
concentrated marketing effort. 
Organization of work in form of projects 
A project is comprised of a project leader, who is appointed by top management, and a 
group of workers. It is the job of the project leader to recruit a team to carry out the 
project. To do this, the project leader advertises the project on an electronic (company) 
bulletin board, using hisher workstation, and employees sign up for the project using 
their workstations. 
Employees can sign up for whatever projects they fancy, but they are only allowed to 
leave a project if the project leader agrees, or if they can sell their present task to 
somebody else (find a replacement). If, for instance, someone identifies a new business 
opportunity and can obtain top management support (resources) for it, he/she will become 
the project leader for this opportunity and can start recruiting staff immediately. Within a 
couple of hours the project can be created, staffed, and work on it can commence. Being 
able to allocate resources and focus them this quickly greatly improves Oticon's response 
to unanticipated demands from customers. 
Employees occupy several positions 
Employees can work on several tasks, often requiring different skills, at the same time 
and in this way on several projects. This means that they have an opportunity to use their 
skills in ways that are more satisfying to them than if they had only one job. But, it is 
also a much more versatile way for organizing work as well as allowing the company to 
make better use of the diverse set of skills that most employees possess. 
The organization of project work permits employees who want to further develop their 
skills and who are willing to get involved in different projects to do so. As Kolind 
explains, "there is no room for employees that stick to the old concept of one job, one 
person. " 
For instance, it was found that employees in accounting and production could contribute 
in an innovative way to the creation of marketing material. Hearing aids are a product for 
the end-consumer. Employees in accounting might have views on products that 
marketing specialists have not considered. Having workers with different backgrounds 
and perspectives on a project brings diversity into play in a natural manner. 
New control philosophy 
Top management in Oticon believes that employees who have chosen to sign up for a 
particular project will prove to be much more interested their work than if they were 
assigned to jobs by management. Thus, they will be more responsible for the own work 
and they will be more motivated to do it effectively. This means that managerial 
resources are freed up as there is no longer a need for project leaders to act as monitors; 
workers perform this role themselves and they have proved effective at it. Instead, the 
demand is now for project leaders to act as innovators and motivators. 
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Perquisites for the organizational Metamorphosis in Oticon 
The dramatic organizational changes described6 above, however, could not have been 
achieved if it had not been for two distinct change strategies: a new open plan office lay- 
out, and elimination of 95% of all paper. 
No private desk 
Oticon decided to do away with private offices for everyone in the fm, including 
Kolind. They took down all the walls and created one large open space. All employees 
have identical desks and chairs located in the open space with only a workstation and a 
mobile phonekharger on each desk The principle is that if employees need to work 
together on a number of projects with different people, it was not practical to have 
everyone in a fured location. Accordingly, workers set up where ever they choose and 
people change physical location often. 
Since employees now no longer have a private desk, everybody is left with a small 
lockable caddie with one drawer for personal things and a couple of shelves for storing up 
to ten fies. Whenever an employee wants to move, helshe can just wheel the caddie to an 
empty desk where one just sets up. All physical artifacts are in the caddie and access to 
worker specific information is through the workstation. A major reshufning of 80 
employees in December 1993 was accomplished within two hours. 
Elimination of paper 
One of Kolind's change strategies was for a "paperless office," where everyone had a 
workstation7 that would permit them to access a common set of office applications and all 
their own files, independent of where they were seated, physically. As all documents are 
scanned when they are received and employees are discouraged from keeping paper files, 
95% of the paper in the office has been eliminated. Information is stored in electronic 
form and can be retrieved from any workstation if one has access authority. Once the ID 
code has been entered, access is provided to central files and a personal calendar along 
with tools for creating, transmitting, duplicating, and storing documents that may contain 
text, drawings, and graphics8. Oticon decided that rather than accessing all data over the 
network, it was often easier just to move a worker's central processing unit (CPU) along 
with the caddie when changing desks (and plug in a local monitor and keyboard). 
With all information in electronic form and identical work space for everyone, a person 
can easily change desks in order to join a new work group. Once when Kolind was out of 
the office, a group of employees decided that they needed his space and they moved his 
belongings somewhere else! 
The Oticon story has been told by Peters(1992), by Holtham (1992), by Morsing (1994), by Thygesen- 
Poulsen ( 1993), by CNI?, by BBC, and it has been the topic of countless newspaper and journal articles in 
Denmark. 
The workstations are 386 PCs with 8 Mb memory running Windows and LanManager. The key 
application for scanning of documents is based on HP-AIMS, which is a development tool that uses an 
Infonnix database system. This system was developed with Andersen Consulting. 
In late 1993, Oticon acquired Group Systems V, a group decision support system in order to provide 
meeting support. In this way they hope to improve the collaborative decision making environment within 
the head office. 
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What is more important than the reduction in the amount of paper is that the physical 
layout can be easily rearranged to match any new task structure. For example, if there is 
a customer complaint from a hearing aid clinic in Atlanta, it is possible to create a new 
project to handle the complaint within a matter of hours. Everybody receives a brief 
description of the new project on their workstation, and they can evaluate for themselves 
whether they have something to contribute to the solution. If they should want to work 
on solving the problem, they can sign up for the project. A few hours later, a full project 
group can be established, with desks next to each other, working to solve the customer's 
problem. In this manner, Oticon is able to bring a full range of resources to bear on a 
problem much more quickly than can their competitors. 
Results obtained so far in Oticon 
No formal, independent assessment has been carried out of the organizational 
transformation at Oticon. Accordingly, we can provide only impressions of the 
consequences of these changes along with an opinion of their overall affect, 
One aspect that was not expected has been the difficulty in classifying incoming 
documents in such a way that they can be accessed by other than the person who does the 
classification. Another unexpected occurrence has been the unwillingness of employees 
to sign up for new tasks beyond the ones they already have. This may be because 
everyone works harder now than they did before. There seems to be more pressure on 
individual workers now due to the expectations of their colleagues (social control) than 
there was with the prior, traditional, managerial control system. 
From January 1991 to January 1992 (the transition period) no one in the head ofice 
resigned. However, there was a 10-15% layoff, particularly affecting secretaries and 
administrative support staff. This is partly due to almost everyone now being able to 
handle their own correspondence and record keeping. Job satisfaction appears to be up 
too. Oticon is perceived now as a more interesting place to work and tasks are more 
challenging. Few want to go back to the old way of working. 
It is our impression that the results obtained in Oticon so far have been positive. Even 
though many of the changes are not likely to show up in the bottom line (e-g., market 
share obtained through new innovative products or better service to clinics) there are 
indications that Oticon has improved its competitive position. The profits declared for 
1992 were nine times better than those of 1989 and 1990 (the company had a loss in 
1991) and sales are increasing. More important, however, it has been possible to reduce 
the time-to-market for new products significantly. The recently introduced Multifocus 
System model, where the hearing aid adjusts to the level of background noise, was 
brought to market six months earlier than it would have been possible under the old 
product development method. 
Discussion 
We have argued that bringing about massive organizational transformation requires more 
than rethinking basic business functions as advocated in BPR. Even if key processes 
involved in delivering a service or product were recognized and streamlined it would not 
have resulted in the magnitude of performance improvement needed at Oticon These 
changes require a complete re-conceptualization of what it is meant to be a business - not 
just the firm's mission or the content and sequence of tasks workers perform - but a 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-95-13 
rethinking of the way people relate to each other, the work they do, how they are led and 
supervised, the way they are compensated and rewarded, as well as their physical 
environment. Change of this magnitutide has been called "frame-breaking" (Tushman 
and others 1986). We call this complete re-interpretation of a fm its Metamorphosis. 
In order to illustrate the extent to which a Metamorphosis goes beyond BPR, we consider 
five dimensions along which the change in Oticon took place. 
Holistic vision 
All writers on BPR argue that change has to be driven by a vision. The question is who 
creates this vision and of what is it ? In the early work by Davenport and Short (1990) 
the business vision was the starting point for the redesign. Later, the vision was reduced 
to "process visions" (Davenport 1993), that is, they come after identification of business 
processes to be redesigned. 
At Oticon, the vision was different; it was a radical statement of what the company 
wanted to be. "Be the No. 1 hearing aid company by 1997," as Lars Kolind formulated it. 
"One in five in 95" as Jan Carlsson has expressed the SAS vision. 
But the vision has to be more than what one desires to be; a goal. It must identify a 
consistent set of strategies for getting there. As part of creating these strategies, all 
assumptions about a firm need to be questioned and the way business is done rethought. 
At Oticon, this involved re-conceptualizing the product they were selling (a service with a 
product attached instead of a mass-manufactured product); redefining their customers 
(not the hearing aid clinics but the customers of the clinics - the consumer of the hearing 
aid); a totally new organizational structure (flexible project groups instead of a normal 
hierarchy); new job structure (multiple rather than single jobs); new reward and incentive 
structures (less prestructured and more based on informal performance appraisals from all 
project managers one is working for); new control structures (self control rather than 
middle management supervision); new office lay-out (open plan instead of individual 
offices); new technology (the integrated IT office support system); a new firm ownership 
arrangement (major portion held by workers and management rather than just held 
privately); and most important, acknowledging that human resources were the f m ' s  
most important asset. The slogan internally at Oticon was, ''Thi.uk the Unthinkable."g 
Focus on employees rather than business processes 
It has become common to focus on business processes as a starting point for BPR. 
Business processes are certainly important, but focusing on them to the exclusion of all 
other factors that determine worker behavior tends to preserve the status quo rather than 
to facilitate massive change. And concentrating on redesigning only business processes 
promotes efficiency at the expense of innovation and flexibility. 
Instead of business processes, the focus at Oticon was on enhancing the motivation of 
each individual employee. The expectation was that if barriers to employee performance 
were removed (these were mostly viewed in terms of constraints on what employees 
could and could not do) and workers were provided with advanced productivity 
enhancement tools along with new skills, they would perform better as individuals, 
perform in a manner more consistent with the interests of the company, and would have 
better working life quality too. 
This is also the title of a popular book about Oticon by Thygesen-Poulsen ( 1993) 
I 
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Commitment 
However, if a massive change along the lines suggested here is to succeed, employees 
must be strongly committed to i t  This commitment needs to be motivated positively 
rather than negatively (for example, by the fear of loosing one's job). In Oticon, 
employees are given shares in the company each year. As of 1991, employee ownership 
was at 6% with the intention for it to rise to 25% in the future. 
Another factor that created positive commitment to the change was the "fish-bowl" 
effect. Lars Kolind skiWully used stories in the media about the re-invention of Oticon to 
create a positive, desirable image for the fm. The (fairy tale) story has been told over 
and over in the newspapers and media in Denmark and abroad. This means that every 
employee has been the recipient of positive attention; people are curious to learn more 
about the firm and what it is like to work there. These positive attitudes associated with 
the Oticon story have been transferred to workers making it difficult for them to view the 
firm negatively, or for that matter objectively. 
Participative rather than external driven approach 
It is often argued that worker participation is good for situations involving gradual 
change, but not for those with radical change because nobody will be willing to cut their 
own throat. People are just too self centered to put the interests of the fm before their 
own. BPR, as we have mentioned, is described as top down and expert led, probably for 
just this reason. 
Contrary to most organizational transformations described in the BPR literature, e.g. (I/S 
Analyzer 1993), the process followed at Oticon was participative. It was not restricted to 
a few managers or led by an external consultant. Everyone was informed and involved 
one way or another in implementing the change and most of it was worked out by the 
employees themselves. Although the process was driven by the vision of Lars Kolind 
and his charismatic leadership style was always in view, it was still a very open process. 
In the Metamorphosis approach, the emphasis is to such an extent on motivating 
employees by enhancing the skills and capabilities, that the change process could not be 
driven by an external entity1° 
Culture 
A massive change of the type that took place at Oticon requires an egalitarian culture 
because so much is being asked of workers. The old Oticon was elitist As an example, 
there were five classes of company cars depending on a person's managerial level. When 
Kolind joined the company, he was offered a royal-blue Jaguar XJ Sovereign 6.2, with 
leather seats and mahogany-panels, which had been driven by the former CEO. He 
thanked them and said that his old Saab would be good enough. It did not take long 
before the standard tier of company cars had adjusted itself (Morsing 1994). It is clear 
that Kolind is keen to have as little distance as possible between the top and bottom of the 
fm. He might even argue that there is no bottom at dl. 
Analysis 
lo In Oticon two senior staff were recruited from the outside, one to advise on internal change and the other 
to lead the design of the integrated IT office system. These two workers are now normal employees. 
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Can we place the events that took place in Oticon is a somewhat broader perspective. 
Tushman, Newman and Romanelli (1986) suggest that the need for context frame- 
breaking organizational change springs from three classes of factors: industry 
discontinuities, product-life-cycle shifts, and internal company dynamics. Both industry 
discontinuities and product-life-cycle shifts played a role in Oticon. They go on to note: 
Frame-breaking change is driven by shifts in business strategy. As strategy shifts 
so too must structure, people, and organizational processes (Tushman and others 
1986, p. 9). 
We might add that technology too is likely to shift. They note that frame-breaking 
change "is revolutionary change of the system as opposed to incremental changes in the 
system." Six factors are usually involved: reformed mission and core values, altered 
power and status, reorganization, revised patters of interaction, and new executives. At 
Oticon, all six factors played a role, providing good support for Tushman, Newrnan and 
Romanelli7s concept of frame-braking change. 
Bashein, Markus and Riley (1994) have proposed a set of preconditions that govern 
success and failure in business process reengineering. Of the positive preconditions they 
identify, seven - senior management commitment~sponsorship, empowered and 
collaborative workers, strategic context of growthlexpansion, a shared vision, sound 
management processes, appropriate people participating full time, and sufficient budget - 
were present in Oticon. The other factor they identify, realistic expectations, does not 
appear to have been operative. Oticon charged ahead. 
While the Bashein model is consistent with the Oticon experience, we believe that the 
factors we have identified are important aspects of radical organizational transformation 
or frame-breaking change. 
Role of IT in the Metamorphosis 
In BPR, IT is a fundamental part of the rethinking, if not the primary driver. IT was 
never the starting point of the organizational transformation at Oticon. Kolind had a 
vague idea of what technology could do, but he formulated his vision without any 
detailed analysis of IT. There was never an articulated IT strategy that was aligned with 
the business strategy (Venkatraman 1991). 
Oticon had determined that a development engineer spends up to two thirds of hidher 
time generating and searching for information. If that effort could be reduced by making 
the process easier, substantial increases in effectiveness could occur. However, Kolind 
did understand that a well thought out and integrated office system could help achieve his 
vision of a paperless office with information available where and when it was needed. 
When Oticon did not have the technical resources to develop the office system, they 
recruited a leader and formed a strategic alliance with two outside firms to develop it. 
While the supervisory structure has changed and workers have more varied jobs, this is 
mainly due to the change strategy Oticon followed - cross training and self selection of 
assignments - rather than the undermining of the hierarchy that might result from high 
connectivity (through the office system). Technology supported the new control structure 
(self managed) by providing information to workers when and where they need it. 
Contrary to notions in Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) literature, where 
technology is used to overcome barriers of space and time, Oticon preferred to co-locate 
workers as a means of achieving synergy and integration. Thus, technology was used 
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mainly to facilitate easy worker movement around the head office and reconfiguration of 
work groups instead of supporting geographically remote workers. 
Technology has also had a rationali2ling influence on individual and group behavior. The 
need to make things explicit along with the direct cause-effect results of actions taken 
leads workers to become more responsible for their actions and for these being more 
visible to others. And we believe that technology has contributed to cultural change at 
Oticon. The more egalitarian climate is supported by equal and easy access to 
information and by the ease of communication with fellow workers provided by the 
office system. 
Although IT has not been the cause of the radical transformation at Oticon, it certainly 
has facilitated these changes. The flexibility in physical location and the ability to 
quickly concentrate resources would be difficult to accomplish without the integrated IT 
office system. 
Conclusion 
W e  technology plays an important role in radical organizational transformation, it is 
not central to it. Rather, technology is an enabler. Technology allows different 
organizational options to be used that would not be practical without it. Just as reinforced 
concrete permitted buildings to be designed with previously impractical forms (for 
example, Saarinen's TWA terminal at JFK airport) so technology allows us to restructure 
organizations in ways that were not previously possible. 
We must always remember it is not technology itself that should be the primary focal 
point of organizational transformation. What is important is the vision of how an 
organization can be transformed, It is the new way to motivate workers; the way that 
coordination can be accomplished naturally; it is how to bring the right resources to bear 
on a problem without direct intervention; it is the way a product can be brought to market 
significantly faster than your competition; and it is the way that local and global needs 
can be reconciled. Technology is only the hand maiden of these changes. 
The Oticon experience provides many clues to bringing about radical organizational 
change. Oticon was not conceived and then implemented. Oticon was not a one time 
change followed by business a s  usual. There was no final destination identified in 
advance and no chart to guide the passage. Oticon evolved and continues to do so. It is 
dynamic. Stay tuned .... 
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